The Salvador Option

It doesn't matter whether the U.S. opts for the "Salvador Option" in Iraq, or not. People forget that what drove the Salvadoran opposition to the negotiation table in 1992 wasn't the U.S. sponsored death squads of the 1980's: instead, it was the implosion of the U.S.S.R., and the loss of weaponry and international support (mostly from a suddenly impoverished Cuba) that resulted. Just as important was the sudden lack of interest of the U.S. in continuing to sponsor its side of the war. Suddenly faced with fickle sponsors, the Salvadoran combatants decided to lay down arms and start politicking again.

Employing the "Salvadoran Option" in Iraq won't work: Kurdish and Shiite hit men don't know their way around the Sunni areas that well. Even if they are successful at their assassinations, that violence just inflames the next round of civil war payback. The whole point, after all, is to quell the fighting, not start another round. There is still a lot of stashed weaponry and money, and plenty of willing recruits, to continue the war, even if Syrian and Saudi connections are broken.

Sponsorship issues are not in play. We are fighting a colonial-style guerilla war against a well-armed native insurgency. To avoid yet more humiliation for America in Iraq, and help avoid an Iraqi civil war, when it comes to the "Salvador Option," our forces have to say: "just fuhgeddaboutit!"